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Abstract
Italian Law no. 219/2017 established the advance care direc-
tives (“Disposizioni anticipate di trattamento” – DAT), a legal
document specifying the person’s wishes in relation to health,
drawn up in case of the possible future incapacity to make
informed decisions. DAT are an important instrument of empow-
erment for a person who is not necessarily a “patient” and enable
the dialogue between healthcare providers and patient to continue
when the latter is no longer able to take part consciously. DAT can
only be implemented by guaranteeing the fundamental rights of
the person, i.e. by ensuring the “non-complicated” use of this
instrument and easy access to the DAT whenever it may be neces-
sary. Furthermore, on the one hand, the requirement of adequate
prior medical information has to contend with the fact that the
wishes expressed in the document may have been formed outside
of the therapeutic relationship; on the other hand, institutions must
ensure that DAT are collected and recorded in such a way as to
ensure their availability whenever and wherever necessary.
Directives
The medicalisation of our existence and the progress of scien-
tific research and technology have highlighted the need to rede-
fine the boundaries of the therapeutic relationship and reaffirm the
central importance, in the care pathway, not of the disease but of
the patient, considered holistically, which also includes their pref-
erences, personal beliefs, values and their notion of quality of life.
From this perspective, in order to forge a relationship based on
consent and guarantee a treatment pathway based on the appropri-
ateness of care, commensurate with the clinical condition and the
person, Italian Law no. 219/2017i established the advance care
directives (“Disposizioni anticipate di trattamento” – DAT), a
legal document containing a person’s wishes in relation to health,
drawn up in case of the possible future incapacity to make
informed decisions.
The need to value any wishes previously expressed and guar-
antee they are respected in the event of incapacity of the person
concerned can be observed in past judgments ruled by the Italian
Courts, in doctrine, in the initiatives of the regional and national
legislator and of local institutions.1 In particular, the institution of
the Support Administration (“Amministrazione di sostegno”),
introduced in order to ensure adequate support for any person
who, due to an illness or physical or mental impairment, is unable,
even partially or temporarily, to take care of their own interests,
provided space for promoting these advance directives.ii The prac-
tice of including a document of prior designation of a support
administrator, in anticipation of possible future incapacity, with
the indication of their preferences regarding care, led to the recog-
nition of this document as the tool through which to convey
advance expressions of will, without prejudice to the effective
recognition these wishes being subject to legal scrutiny, should the
need to protect the individual arise.2
For five years now, moreover,  these DAT have not challenged
the medical Code of Ethics: put simply, once declarations they
then became provisions, perhaps also because the power to
instruct can only result from a regulatory intervention that, above
all, clarifies simultaneously the limits and the content of the pro-
fessional obligation of counterbalancing.3
The subjective requirements of the DAT are being of legal age
and being of full mental capacity, a requirement that raises the
question of the procedure for establishing this capacity, in partic-
ular in the case of a legal document delivered to the municipal
civil registry office or to healthcare facilities.  The law does not
contain any reference to the legal capacity, nor to the status civi-
tatis of the signatory: the Council of State has specified that the
national database used to record the DAT may also collect the
DAT of persons not registered with the National Health Service,4
since this entails the constitutionally recognised guarantee of fun-
damental human rights.
i Law of 22 December 2017, n. 219 (Rules on informed consent and advance care directives
- “Norme in materia di consenso informato e di disposizioni anticipate di trattamento”),
published in the Official Gazette n. 12 of 16 January 2018.
ii Law of 9 January 2004, n. 6 (Introduction in the first book, Title XII of the Civil Code of
Chapter I, relating to the establishment of the Support Administration and amendment of
articles 388, 414, 417, 418, 424, 426, 427 and 429 of the Civil Code in respect of interdic-
tion and incapacitation, as well as the rules of implementation, rules of coordination and
final rules – “Introduzione nel libro primo, titolo XII, del codice civile del capo I, relativo
all’istituzione dell’amministrazione di sostegno e modifica degli articoli 388, 414, 417, 418,
424, 426, 427 e 429 del codice civile in materia di interdizione e di inabilitazione, nonchè
relative norme di attuazione, di coordinamento e finali”), published on the Official Gazette
n. 14 of 19 January 2004.
Significance for public health
The impact of such legislation on public health could be significant for vari-
ous reasons: empowering individuals who are able, precisely, to make deci-
sions “now” to be applied “later”, means fully respecting an individual’s
choices irrespective of the reasons: for example, the reasons may be of an
entirely personal nature, in some cases driven by the past experience of
someone they know, or of a religious nature, with repercussions on the fam-
ily (such as their children’s health). In this sense, healthcare choices are
identified with full acceptance of individual empowerment, which can occur
only after the doctor has provided the person/patient with adequate informa-
tion.  Moreover, should the patient refuse treatment, the health resources
allocated for their treatment could be re-allocated to another individual who
needs them and could benefit in terms of quality and quantity of life.   
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DAT must be drawn up after having acquired adequate medical
information about the consequences of personal choices.
Legislation does not specify the source and procedure for acquir-
ing such information by a person who is not necessarily a
“patient”: while a qualified professional would guarantee the
requirement of adequacy, especially with respect to “DIY” search-
es, recourse to DAT, a typical instrument for exercising a funda-
mental individual right, must be prevented from being too expen-
sive or difficult precisely in terms of acquiring this adequate infor-
mation.5 DAT are an instrument of empowerment, and they can
only be implemented by guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the
person, i.e. by ensuring  the “non-complicated” use of this instru-
ment; on the other hand, although DAT are an ideal tool for contin-
uation of the dialogue when a patient is no longer able to make an
informed contribution,6 the requirement of adequate prior medical
information has to contend with the fact that the wishes expressed
in the document could also have been formed outside of the thera-
peutic relationship.
The Council of State observes,4 including in relation to the
possible liability of the doctor who adheres to the DAT, consider-
ing them to be valid, that there is a clear need for certainty regard-
ing the “adequacy” of the medical information acquired by the per-
son concerned and regarding the consequences of their choices and
states that although this cannot be identified in terms of the validity
of the legal document, it seems definitely appropriate to certify this
circumstance.
According to the National Council of Notaries it is desirable
that the document proves the provision of the medical information
necessary to formulate the provisions,7 with the added option,
when drafting, of referring to or attaching medical documents or
providing the name of the physician with which the signatory had
contact, as the opening part of the document.
DAT may include instructions relating to specific health treat-
ments, but may also cover a wider scope of expressions of wishes
in the medical field, in relation to a broader and more complex uni-
verse of principles and personal values that help shape a person’s
attitude towards choices in this field.8
In this context, the so-called “fiduciario” can play a central
role, as the trusted person indicated by the signatory − and who has
accepted the appointment − with the task of acting on his/her
behalf and representing him/her in relations with the doctor and
with the healthcare facilities or guaranteeing his/her wishes are
respected, including by updating such wishes: the need for a prior
agreement between the doctor and the proxy, who knows the biog-
raphical identity as well as the most intimate intentions of the
patient, would significantly reduce the risk of deviation from the
instructions departed.9 The figure of the proxy restores the rela-
tionship of care and trust with the doctor and the healthcare team
in view of the decisions to be taken, on the basis of an appointment
founded on the choices made by the patient-signatory,10 promoting
the individual autonomy and allowing the “dual” configuration of
the relationship, despite the incapacity of the person concerned.
DAT must only be disregarded for medical and health reasons:8
evident inconsistency or non-correspondence to the actual clinical
condition of the patient or the existence of treatment that was
unforeseeable at the time of signing and that offers the real possi-
bility of improving the standard of life.
DAT can take the form of public deed or authenticated private
writing or private writing delivered personally by the signatory to
the civil registry office of the municipality of residence or to the
healthcare facilities, where legally permitted, without prejudice to
the option of using video recording or communication devices for
people with disabilities.
The provision of such formal requirements, much more rigor-
ous than that required for informed consent to health treatment,iii
raises the question of the binding nature of all those statements
that, although documented and/or documentable, are not expressed
in the forms established by special rules or delivered to the offices
of the public administration indicated,9 such as indications
expressed on social media or by computer or telephone or in writ-
ing. Considering these other expressions of personal wishes could
also help to reconstruct the wishes of the person concerned, within
the framework of a legal system that puts the person “at the cen-
tre”, even when they are incapable of making their own decisions,
acting in the best interests of the patient will become central among
the requirements for certainty of the form - to protect the content
and the origin of a document that is still, broadly speaking a living
will − and attention to the substance emerging from the declaration
− in view of fulfilling the intimate wishes of the person − in any
circumstance, mode or form expressed, provided that it is docu-
mentable.9 It is here, therefore, that the legislator confirms and
strengthens the jurisprudential approaches, under a seal that will
now be very difficult to break in court.11 And, above all, it will no
longer be necessary to go to court: firstly, and quite simply because
the proxy, unlike a support administrator, does not require a decree
of appointment by the judge supervising the guardianship, but
merely the drafting of a public record, an authenticated private
agreement or a private agreement delivered to the civil registry
office (art. 4, par. 6). Secondly, because the legislator has specifi-
cally outlined the boundaries within which the patient’s wishes
may legitimately be expressed and be respected: therefore, judicial
authorisation will no longer be required in order to respect a refusal
that directly results in death – something that was previously
approved and sometimes required from the standpoint (in part
understandably) of defensive medicine. Consequently, the tutelary
judge will only rise in the case of conflict between doctor and legal
representative (whether they be the parents of a child, the guardian
of an incapacitated person; the carer of a disabled person or sup-
port administrator of a beneficiary) i.e. where the healthcare staff
and the proxy do not agree as to the contents and the procedure for
application of the DAT. This could be due to uncertainty or an
omission regarding the individual’s genuine wishes and a lack of
agreement between guarantor and expert (doctor), who objective-
ly considers and pursues the best interests of the incapacitated per-
son, and an individual equally acting as guarantor who does not
protect the person through a specific profession, but by means of a
power (in any case attributed by the court or by legislation) mostly
justified by closeness, a relationship with the sick person.
Consequently, where such a discrepancy of opinions and views
does not occur judicial intervention is not envisaged, as it would
result in the (incompetent) examination of the evaluation carried
out by medical staff, also verified by the proxy (for example, for
DAT that do not provide for the case that actually occurred) or by
the legal representative. Therefore, if, in a case of equity interests
(acts of extraordinary administration) of the incapacitated person is
brought before a judge, it is because the work of the representative
is not acknowledged. On the other hand, if the cessation of treat-
ment results in the patient’s death this is certainly an extreme and
very serious result, but justified by an evaluation of the lack of
“appropriateness” and “need” (art. 3, par. 5), i.e. treatment that is
no longer proportionate nor justifiable, endorsed by a person who,
by law, pursues nothing but the interests of the incapacitated per-
son. 
iiiArt. 1 (Informed consent) Paragraph 4 of Law n. 219/ 2017 establishes that informed con-
sent, acquired in the ways and with the instruments best suited to the conditions of the
patient, shall be documented in written form or through video recordings or, for people with
disabilities, through devices that allow them to communicate. Informed consent, in whatev-
er form expressed, shall be included in the clinical dossier and in the electronic health file.
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The seal of the judge would add nothing new, different or fur-
ther, to a similar, joint evaluation, unless there is doubt over
whether the healthcare staff may be driven by the aim of conserv-
ing resources and the legal representative may have gone against
their appointment.12
The difference between shared care planning and advance care
directives fully lies in the prior establishment, or not, of the doc-
tor-patient relationship. This distinction, however, not only oper-
ates in terms of timeliness of the consent and “relationship”
between the individual and healthcare staff, but also with regard to
the disclosure and knowledge of these documents, where the pro-
vision for their inclusion in medical records (art. 5, par. 4) presup-
poses precisely that the patient already has a medical record and
one or more attending physicians. If, instead, this has not already
been undertaken, the problem of recording such documents
becomes of capital importance, capable of invalidating the innov-
ativeness of a good part of the reference legislation, only requiring
the delivery of a copy to the proxy in person (in terms of timeliness
and effectiveness of knowledge of the document, without counting
the non-mandatory nature of the designation of a ‘trusted’ person).
The only tool useful for this purpose − a single computerised
national register − has not yet been established, as well known.
The Italian Data Protection Authority issued an opinion on 29
May 2019 on the draft decree for the institution at the Ministry of
Health of a national database for the collection of advance care
directives.13
This database, established at the Ministry of Health, will have
the purpose of recording DAT, promptly updating them in case of
renewal, amendment or revocation and providing full access to the
doctor who is treating the patient in the case of incapacity to make
their own decisions, as well as to any possible trustee appointed by
the patient; the database will also record the possible appointment
of a proxy and the database functions will also be guaranteed for
persons not registered with the National Health Service.
The data will be kept for 10 years from the death of the person
concerned and may be accessed by the doctor who is treating the
patient unable to express their wishes, and the proxy, where
appointed.
The database will be fed by municipal civil registry officials,
notaries and the person in charge of the relevant organisational unit
of the Regional Authorities that provide the service, with which the
“original copies” DAT are filed. 
Pending the completion of the national database the Data
Protection Authority has asked for greater safeguards as regards
the procedures for access to DAT by the doctor who is treating the
patient or by the proxy; the Authority has also asked for the correct
identification of the parties who, as data controllers, are authorised
to transmit the DAT to the database. The Ministry must therefore
identify procedures that better comply with privacy regulations in
order to provide the doctor and the proxy with information about
the existence of the declaration and the place where it is stored.
Blatant inconsistencies in the DAT (or lack of correspondence
with the actual medical condition of the patient), moreover, allows
(i.e. forces) the physician to disregard them (art. 4, par.5). Within
this projection, on the other hand, it seems reasonable to include
the hypothesis of excessive vagueness (i.e. insufficient detail),
inherent in an automatism and bureaucracy that poorly marry with
an adequate and authentic evaluation of personal wishes.
More broadly, it concerns the possibility of respecting DAT
where not adequately expressed in terms of the accuracy of the lan-
guage, informed choices and knowledge of the relative conse-
quences. There is a problem, therefore, of terminology; of the pass-
ing of time (since there is no deadline, the healthcare staff could
feel less and less constrained, as the years go by); of a change in
the state of the art, but also the evolution of the disease (what
seemed “extraordinary” and unacceptable becomes ordinary and
easily conceivable, even in one’s own body). In this sense, more-
over, the further we move from the expression of wishes by the
person directly concerned, the greater the risk that the proxy will
interpret them, rather than respecting and applying them.11
The intervention of the legislator takes on, first and foremost,
a strong and distinct ethical meaning, with regard to both health
and judicial operators; it states and specifies the aegis of the
Fundamental Charter; it reinforces and supports the guidelines and
the developments of ordinary, administrative and constitutional
rulings in recent decades.14 The result, therefore, is that it relieves
the Code of Ethics of inappropriate deputising functions and cre-
ates ad hoc legal institutions to resolve the problems in question
(against the efforts made by the courts to adapt the existing institu-
tions). The legislator’s wish, therefore, is not to establish and reg-
ulate liability ex post from the additional or sole perspective of
sanctions, but rather to encourage, as far as possible, the adoption
of consensual doctor/patient decisions, reconstructing and human-
ising the relationship, relaxing the tone and clarifying the mutual
rights and obligations.15 It is the role of the judge, however, to
come out the other side changed, where their intervention is
required only as a last resort in cases of otherwise irresolvable con-
flict between science and personal wishes - against the activism
and creativity requested of them more or less recently.3
Measures have been taken to recover the data relating to the
filing of DAT with notaries in Brescia or with the Municipal
Authority; up to June 2019, only 8 DAT have been filed with
notaries (8 notaries involved), of which 3 men and 5 women, 7
Italians and 1 German (of 98 notaries, 50 responded to our
request); the men were aged 43, 60 and 72 years, while the women
were aged 60, 66, 69, 75 and 83.
As regards filing with the Municipal Authority, the legal docu-
ments were accessed at our request by a Municipal Councillor.
We would like to specify that 169,219 persons of legal age are
registered with the Brescia Municipal Registry. As at 27 June 2019,
758 DAT have been received and filed with this Municipal
Authority. There are no other data available since the Ministry of
the Interior, with Circular no. 1 of 4.2.2018 laying down the oper-
ational instructions for Civil Registry Officials on the matter, spec-
ifies that the Office having received the DAT, must limit itself to
recording an ordered chronological list of the declarations made
and ensure their appropriate storage in conformity with the princi-
ples of confidentiality of personal data referred to in Legislative
Decree no. 196 of 30.6.2003.
In accordance with this Circular, the Office periodically dis-
closes the number of DAT received to the above-mentioned
Ministry, by means of the Territorial Government Office -
Prefecture of Brescia. DAT are registered at the counters for regis-
tering Civil Registry declarations in full compliance with the con-
fidentiality and protection of personal data required by law for
these special and particular declarations. Up to June 2019, the data
at our disposal revealed that only a small segment of the population
has “responded” to the possibility of drawing up advance care
directives. This is probably due to several factors: first and fore-
most, last year and even now there is very little information on the
subject. In fact, the legislation may well be not at all well-known
and only a small proportion of the population knows what advance
care directives are. Whereas, on the one hand, we have all become
accustomed to being asked for our consent, for example for pro-
cessing personal data, or in healthcare, it has become common
practice to ask for consent to “act” on the body of patients, it is not
yet in our mind-set to think in advance about what we would want
or, more importantly, not want to happen in the event that, in the
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more or less immediate future, we were to find ourselves needing
medical care. In this latter case we refer, for example, to the refusal
of certain treatments, such as blood transfusions, by Jehovah’s
Witnesses, who could therefore be interested in DAT precisely for
the purposes of such refusal. Such declarations would therefore
explain and legalise a refusal motivated by religious choices.
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